Dynamics of central control and subsidiary autonomy in the management of human resources: case-study evidence from US MNCs in the UK by Ferner, A et al.
The Dynamics of Central Control and
Subsidiary Autonomy in the Management of
Human Resources: Case-Study Evidence from
US MNCs in the UK
Anthony Ferner, Phil Almond, Ian Clark, Trevor Colling, Tony
Edwards, Len Holden and Michael Muller-Camen
Abstract
This article revisits a central question in the debates on the management of
multinationals: the balance between centralized policy-making and subsidiary
autonomy. It does so through data from a series of case studies on the management
of human resources in American multinationals in the UK. Two strands of debate are
confronted. The first is the literature on differences between multinationals of different
national origins which has shown that US companies tend to be more centralized,
standardized, and formalized in their management of human resources. It is argued
that the literature has provided unconvincing explanations of this pattern, failing 
to link it to distinctive features of the American business system in which US
multinationals are embedded. The second strand is the wider debate on the balance
between centralization and decentralization in multinationals. It is argued that 
the literature neglects important features of this balance: the contingent oscillation
between centralized and decentralized modes of operation and (relatedly) the way in
which the balance is negotiated by organizational actors through micro-political
processes whereby the external structural constraints on the company are defined 
and interpreted. In such negotiation, actors’ leverage often derives from exploiting
differences between the national business systems in which the multinational operates.
Keywords: US multinational companies, human resource management, centralization,
subsidiary autonomy, power
This article uses case-study evidence on the management of employment
relations in US multinational companies (MNCs) to consider a staple question
of the literature on multinationals: the balance between centralized policy-
making and subsidiary autonomy. It confronts two strands of debate. First, it
addresses the body of research that has examined differences between MNCs
of different national origins. US companies have been found to be more
centralized, standardized, and formalized in their management of human
resources and other employment-relations policies. While the findings of the
present research are broadly in line with those of other studies, it tries to go
beyond the existing literature to link observed patterns to distinctive features
of the American business system in which these MNCs are ‘embedded’.
Second, it explores the implications of its findings for some of the dominant
themes of the familiar literature on the degree of central control over subsidiary
operations. This is one of the key questions of multinational operation; it
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underlies much of the extensive debate on the need to balance global
integration and local responsiveness, as well as associated themes of the rise
of ‘federal’ or ‘heterarchic’ MNCs in which strategic capabilities and power
resources are widely disseminated among international operating units. The
issue is also fundamental to the question of management control in MNCs;
for example, the extent to which centralized hierarchical decision-making
processes can substituted by ‘socialization’ of employees into an international
corporate culture. It will be argued that two features of the balance of
centralization–decentralization are under-explored in the MNC literature. 
The first is the oscillation between centralized and decentralized modes of
operation, reflecting short-term contingent managerial adaptations to the
environment. The second is the related negotiation of the balance between
centralization and decentralization through micro-political processes shaped
by, but not determined by structural features of the corporation and its
environment.
The following section addresses in more detail the literature on
centralization-decentralization in general, and more specifically in relation to
MNCs of different national origin. The third section explains the methodology
of the present study. Thereafter, the findings from a study of US MNCs are
presented. Lastly, the conclusion draws out some implications of the study
for the existing literature and briefly discusses possible elaborations of the
micro-political processes associated with centralization–decentralization.
The Literature on Centralization and Decentralization in MNCs
For decades, studies have shown that MNCs of different national origins
exhibit distinctive patterns of centralized control and subsidiary autonomy in
the management of human resource (HR) and industrial relations (IR) policies
and practices, and more generally. The thrust of findings is that US MNCs
are more centralized than those of other nationalities (for example, Child et
al. 2000; Negandhi 1983; Young et al. 1985). Child et al. (2000: 159) in their
study of acquired UK subsidiaries report, for example, that the ‘American
mode of post-acquisition management appears to be hands-on, forceful,
oriented to quick results, and distinctive. The strength with which the
apparently typical American pattern of management practice is reproduced
in their UK acquisitions is undoubtedly enhanced by the greater influence that
US acquirers were reported to exercise.’
As far as employment relations are concerned, the consensus is that while
HR and IR decisions and policies are generally less centralized than in 
other business areas, US MNCs are more centralized on such issues than other
multinationals. Headquarters (HQ) plays an important role in setting or
influencing policy on payment systems, collective bargaining, communica-
tions, union recognition, and welfare and training policies (Bomers and
Peterson 1977; Dunning 1998; Gunnigle 1995; Hamill 1984; Harzing 1999;
Negandhi 1986; Roberts 1972; Young et al. 1985; Yuen and Kee 1993). In
the 1970s, for example, Bomers and Peterson (1977) found that European
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MNCs decentralized IR much more than US MNCs. The latter ‘tended to
make industrial relations policy-making more of an integral part of general
corporate management’ (Bomers and Peterson 1977: 51). In the same vein,
Kujawa (1979: 4–5, 13) argued that while European MNCs’ headquarters
tended to be indifferent to their US subsidiaries’ recognition policies, in US
MNCs such decisions were ‘often impressed with parent company interests,
and industrial relations are likely to be viewed as essential to competitive
strategy’. Negandhi (1983) reported that there was significantly less autonomy
for US subsidiaries compared with Japanese and German counterparts across
such HR areas as training and lay-offs. US companies were also considerably
more centralized on broader strategic management decisions concerning
production scheduling, pricing, and the introduction of new products.
Similarly, Young et al. (1985) found, on the basis of a survey of more than
150 foreign subsidiaries, that US firms had more centralized control over
financial, production, and marketing decisions, and to a lesser extent over
employment and personnel decisions on hiring and the recruitment of senior
managers (see also Hamill 1984).
Not all studies are clear cut. The survey by Guest and Hoque (1996: 63)
found that the higher level of parental influence in US-owned establishments
in the UK fell short of significance, and that US MNCs were no less likely than
other foreign MNCs to recognize unions. But here case-study evidence tends
to clarify the position by suggesting that a non-union policy in US companies
is driven by headquarters’ concerns rather than being a laissez-faire adaptation
to the permissive UK environment. Companies such as McDonald’s, IBM 
or Hewlett-Packard, known for their philosophical objections to collective
workforce representation, have transferred similar policies to many of their
foreign operations (Roberts 1972; Gunnigle 1995; Royle 2000).
Such findings are reinforced by case-study research. Work on US MNCs
in Scotland, for example, has reported strong headquarters intervention in a
range of HR and IR policies (Martin and Beaumont 1999; Tayeb 1998; Tayeb
and Thory 2001) in areas such as union recognition, recruitment, pay, and
employee communications, especially through the use of global staff opinion
surveys.
A second distinctive finding is that centralized policies in US MNCs tend
to be associated with a higher degree of formalization (Bartlett and Ghoshal
1998; Child et al. 2000; Negandhi 1983) and standardization (Harzing 1999;
Kopp 1994; Yuen and Kee 1993) in the management of subsidiaries. Thus,
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998: 186–188) suggest that cross-national integra-
tion in US MNCs relies more on formalization, which they define as the
‘institutionalization of systems and procedures to guide choices’ (1998: 80),
compared with Japanese or European companies. Child et al. (2000: 159)
refer to ‘greater formalization being introduced than in other national groups,
notably in the methods of securing market intelligence, the use of financial
control systems, and communications’. Harzing’s study (1999) of control
mechanisms in subsidiaries found that US companies tend to use more
formalized methods in general, and are less reliant on ‘personal’ control
through expatriates than are, for example, German or Japanese companies.
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It should be noted that formalization is not a necessary condition for
centralization, since central influence may be ensured through direct personal
control by expatriate managers socialized in the culture and practices of the
parent, as has frequently been reported to be the case for Japanese MNCs (for
example, Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998). Nonetheless, in US MNCs formalized
processes can be seen as encouraging centralization by providing channels
for the exertion of central influence in a systematic codified form. Moreover,
formalization can be seen as a facilitator of standardization (that is, having
similar or identical policies across subsidiaries), since elements of policies
and processes are explicitly formulated, providing a common framework of
adoption. Thus Kopp (1994) found that US firms surveyed were much more
likely than Japanese or European MNCs to have performance-evaluation
measures that were standardized across all international operations.
In other words, US MNCs have a tendency to apply centralized policies in
the same or similar ways through the use of standard formal systems across
their global operating units. This is an important question because this proces-
sual characteristic of US MNCs is likely to throw light on the mechanisms
whereby US headquarters exert influence over substantive policies in the
subsidiaries. In other words, parent-company policies in substantive areas
such as pay, employee involvement, training, or culture management may be
transmitted to subsidiaries through explicit, formal, routinized systems that
also permit highly standardized dissemination.
Centralization and the Importance of Country of Origin
These findings raise two interlinked sets of questions. First, few studies have
advanced convincing explanations of national difference among MNCs. They
tend not to trace back observable characteristics of US MNCs to specific
features of the business system in which they are rooted, although there 
are important exceptions (for example, Wever 1995; Yuen and Kee 1993).
Explanations, if offered at all, tend to be essentially culturalist, typically using
Hofstede’s (1980) categories, such as ‘power distance’ and ‘uncertainty
avoidance’ (for example, Ngo et al. 1998). Such approaches, while extremely
influential within the business literature, fail to address the question of the
relationship of ‘cultural values’ to structural and institutional characteristics
of national economic systems, and in their ahistorical bias lacks a sense of
dynamic development within business systems. As a result, they explain very
little about the way in which different national business systems shape MNC
practice.
Nonetheless, there are strong grounds for expecting the patterns described
above: a basic premise of the research is that US MNCs are embedded in 
the assumptions, practices, and institutions of the American business model
(for an extended discussion, see Ferner 2000a). Therefore, if comparative
international research suggests that US MNCs are relatively centralized,
formalized, and standardized in their HR-IR policy, this may be partly
explained by reference to elements of the US business system. Among these
are, notably, the early development, as described by Chandler (1990) and
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others, of formal management functions and control systems, and the use of
these ‘organizational capabilities’ to exert centralized strategic control over
geographically dispersed firms (both within the USA and later internationally)
operating across diverse product markets. A key aspect was the delegation of
responsibilities to subunit managers within strategic parameters determined
by head office and operationalized through formal management control
systems. The tendency to centralization and formalization was reinforced by
the systems developed to manage standardized mass production, including
codified tasks and formalized job descriptions, which continued to influence
management style even after the decline of classical mass production and the
rise of more flexible Japanese-influenced variants such as ‘lean production’
(see, for example, Appelbaum and Batt 1994). As this account suggests,
centralization in the US case went hand in hand with formalization and
standardization.
Moreover, the New Deal model of IR based on company-level collective
bargaining gave impetus to the deployment of standard formal systems within
the firm. This arose from the emphasis on regulation of employment through
a bureaucratic ‘web of rules’, centrally determined by union and company,
regulating lay-offs, rehiring, and promotion (Kochan et al. 1986), as well as
grievance resolution. Formal, standardized bureaucratic systems were also
developed relatively early in the USA to manage the employment of the
expanding white-collar occupational groups, both in unionized and non-union
firms (Edwards 1979).
As a result of such traditions, American companies are likely to have
codified and reproducible management systems that can be managed from a
strategic centre, may be transferred easily to other contexts, and which are
not highly dependent on tacit knowledge — to use a phrase employed 
by Taylor et al. (1996), US HR policies are likely to have high ‘context
generalizability’. As far as the HR function itself is concerned, a number of
features of the US system have encouraged centralization. Notable among
them has been the attempt by several of the most prominent US companies
to deploy innovative ‘welfare capitalist’ HR policies, primarily as a means
of binding the workforce to the company and keeping the threat of
unionization at bay (Jacoby 1997). This has led to a strategic approach to 
HR policy-making, seen as crucial for securing workforce commitment and
retaining management control. Such developments may well provide the
capability for a strategic, centralized approach to international human resource
management (HRM) as well. US MNCs are also likely to have the motive to
transfer policies abroad, given the dominance of the US business system
internationally, which is likely to promote a belief that US HRM practices
represent best practice. Furthermore, the receptivity of host systems to
American HR practices is likely to be increased by the sheer weight of US
subsidiaries in many hosts, including the UK, where US foreign direct
investment accounts for around half of all employment in foreign-owned
enterprises (Dunning 1998).
A further limitation of the literature on country-of-origin differences is that
existing research has relied predominantly upon survey-based, quantitative
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methods. As a result, much of the country-of-origin literature provides a broad
snapshot of patterns rather than capturing the ‘ebb and flow’ of relationships
between the corporate HQ and subsidiaries upon which the assimilation 
of country-of-origin characteristics in subsidiaries is built. Lastly, the
predominantly survey-based literature does not tend to pick up the subtleties
of the process whereby country-of-origin traits are adapted to and modified
by the host environment. In consequence, it may overstate the degree of
ethnocentricity of HRM by conflating HQ policy with actual practice.
Lindholm et al. (1999), for example, report on a study of performance
appraisal of host nationals in China, using semi-structured interviews to
demonstrate that apparently standard international policies in MNCs may be
applied differently in the local business environment.
Centralization, the Country-of-Origin Effect, and the Broader
Centralization-Autonomy Literature
The second set of questions is rather broader. It concerns the relationship
between the findings on MNC nationality and the more general literature 
on central control and subsidiary autonomy in MNCs. There has been an
extensive and long-standing debate on the issue to which a brief overview
cannot do justice. Nevertheless, a number of key themes emerge of relevance
to the arguments of this article.
First, the literature on centralization-decentralization has had a strong
structuralist focus, explaining the degree of centralization by reference to
structural variables such as the relative size of subsidiary and parent, the
importance of the subsidiary for the parent’s overall performance, the age 
of the subsidiary, whether it is greenfield or brownfield, and the degree of
international integration of operations (for a summary, see Edwards et al.
1993). The degree of centralization has been linked to the function performed
by different subsidiaries within the overall corporation (for example, Taylor
et al. 1996; Doz and Prahalad 1994; Bird et al. 1998), and to the substantive
issue — financial and market decisions being more centralized than HR and
IR (see above). Within HR, issues such as pay rates and industrial relations
have been more decentralized than policies on management development,
pay systems or culture management because there is more pressure on the
former to be ‘isomorphic’ to local business cultures (Rosenzweig and Nohria
1994). The ‘resource-based’ strand of literature, as propounded by writers
such as Taylor et al. (1996), also factors in the variable motivation of MNCs
to control HR practices in the subsidiaries, reflecting the degree to which
particular practices are regarded by strategic decision-makers as crucial for
international competitive advantage.
Second, much of the literature is essentially functionalist in orientation.
Particular patterns of centralization-decentralization emerge that are seen as
appropriate to (functional for) a particular set of environmental challenges
and constraints. It is the job of senior executives to ensure the ‘configuration
of assets and capabilities’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998: 67) correspond to the
competitive strategy being adopted. The schema presented by Bartlett and
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Ghoshal (1998: Ch. 4) is well known: ‘multinational’ companies have a
‘decentralized and nationally self-sufficient’ allocation of responsibilities;
‘global’ firms are ‘centralized and globally scaled’; ‘international’ companies
centralize some core competences and decentralize others; while ‘transna-
tional’ companies operate according to ‘flexible centralization’ in which
specialist responsibilities are dispersed among differentiated operating units
linked by strong interdependencies in an ‘integrated network configuration’
(1998: 68, 75).
Third, the conceptualization of the balance between centralization and
decentralization is frequently underpinned by an evolutionary notion of
‘stages of development’: a systematic evolution of MNCs, both in terms 
of broad historical patterns and within the life cycle of individual MNCs,
responding to the evolving structural conditions that confront them (for
example, Perlmutter 1969; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998; Martínez and Jarillo
1989). Within the field of HR-IR, there is an analogous literature which
ascribes patterns of centralization-decentralization to the particular phase of
an MNC’s international development (for example, Adler and Ghadar 1990;
Dowling et al. 1999). Some writers (for example, Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998;
Mtar 2001) argue that the country-of-origin impact seen in the degree of
centralization of control partly reflects the historical phase of evolution of the
international economy at the time at which MNCs internationalized. For
example, the wave of internationalization by US companies in the early
postwar period took place under conditions that permitted a high degree of
standardization and was marked by the transfer of domestic capabilities to
overseas operations (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998: Ch. 3; Dunning 1998).
While many writers are careful to distance themselves from suggestions
that there is a unilinear developmental tendency at work, there is much less
discussion of more contingent dynamics of centralization and autonomy. Yet
such concerns have a long tradition in the literature. Brooke (1984; Brooke
and Remmers 1970: Ch. 3), for example, portrays a constant ‘fluctuation
around the normal line’ (1970: 64) between centralized control and subsidiary
autonomy. This dynamic is generated by the centre’s reaction to poor
subsidiary performance, leading to renewed centralization, followed by a loss
of key local personnel, a lack of initiative in the subsidiary, and pressures for
renewed autonomy.
Fourth, the literature’s concentration on structural explanations, functional
fit, and stages of development gives rise to another striking characteristic 
of accounts of the centralization-decentralization balance: the neglect of
power. Power is not totally unconsidered. For example, Bartlett and Ghoshal
(1998: 186–188) argue that formalization, by routinizing decision-making, is
appropriate for situations in which subsidiaries have countervailing power
and are therefore likely to be able to resist central policy imposition. Similarly,
Ghoshal and Nohria (1989, 1993) use a resource-dependency approach to
argue that the degree of central control over subsidiaries is conditioned by
the mutual dependency of HQ and subsidiaries on resources provided by the
other. As resource levels of the subsidiary increase, interests with HQ may
diverge and HQ dependency on the subsidiary may increase. Ghoshal and
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Nohria hypothesize that centralization will be less where local resources are
high; centralization would cause ‘severe dissonance’ in such circumstances
(1989: 326).
Such accounts do not, however, analyse (or give direct evidence of) the
way in which organizational micro-politics shapes the balance between
centralization and subsidiary autonomy; they merely state that internal power
relations depend on the configuration of resources. Similarly, Bartlett and
Ghoshal (1998) pay homage to the importance of organizational power, but
do not follow through the implications of their arguments. Thus, they refer
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998: 78) to the way in which groups responding to 
the most critical strategic tasks within an MNC gain organizational power
(for example, product divisions dominated decision-making in Matsushita
since a strategy of global-scale efficiency depended on strong business
management). This raises the question of how the strategic thrust was defined
in the first place, and the extent to which the power arising out of strategic
position begets further power. In addition, despite references to power, the
thrust of much of the literature is overwhelmingly based on the assumption
that the appropriate level of centralization or autonomy is determined in a
hierarchical way by top corporate executives. As Forsgren (1990) argues in
criticizing this ‘hierarchical’ perspective, subsidiaries develop their own
objectives and have inherent power.
It will be a principal argument of this article that subsidiaries’ access 
to power resources gives rise to important processes of micro-political
negotiation over the balance between centralization and subsidiary autonomy,
within the limits set by such structural characteristics as those referred to
above. On the one hand, structural changes, both externally in markets and
technologies and internally in, for example, organizational structures, set
limits to the margin of manoeuvre of corporate actors, but on the other 
hand, provide them with an evolving set of resources which they may deploy
in pursuit of their individual and collective interests within the wider
corporation.
The Study
The findings presented in this article are based on data from the British leg
of a study in progress of US MNCs in four European countries: Britain,
Germany, Ireland, and Spain. The broad objectives of the research are to
identify the influence of the US business system on the management of
employment relations in US MNCs and to explore by means of in-depth case
studies the mechanisms whereby such influence is transmitted. Unlike most
studies, both survey and case study, the research has aimed to combine the
headquarters’ ‘view from above’ with the subsidiaries’ ‘view from below’ by
conducting research at both levels. The study set out to explore the distinctive
logic of action of HR decision-making in US MNCs by examining a set 
of processual issues including the degree of centralization and formalization
in relations between subsidiary and HQ, the forms of management control,
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and the mechanisms through which policies and practices are diffused 
to subsidiaries. These issues are investigated through the examination of
substantive HR areas such as performance management, participation and
involvement, collective relations, and work organization.
Fieldwork on the British part of the project, funded by the ESRC, began
in the spring of 1999. In-depth case studies are currently being carried out in
seven British subsidiaries of US companies, in IT, consumer goods, house-
hold products, engineering contracting, and mechanical engineering. A further
four to six in-depth case studies are in progress in sectors including business
services and chemicals and pharmaceuticals. These are supplemented by a
number of less detailed cases. The case studies drawn on in this article are
shown in Table 1. For reasons of confidentiality, pseudonyms are used.
Around 70 interviews have so far been conducted with respondents from
HR, finance, and operations functions in UK subsidiaries, and in five of the
companies, a further 17 interviews have been carried out at the corporate or
European HQ, or both. Interviews are taped, fully transcribed, and coded
using QSR N5 data-analysis software. To ensure a degree of consistency
across cases and countries, all teams work to a detailed common template of
issues, common interview schedules, and a shared coding scheme.
Interviews are supplemented by a wide range of documentary material on
the case companies, including published information such as annual reports,
companies’ Securities and Exchange Commission submissions (form 10K),
and company websites, in order to give a picture of general corporate activity
and structural characteristics, and their evolution over time.
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Firm Sector Interviews
UK European Other
subsidiary and US HQ European 
subsidiaries
EngCo1 mechanical engineering 15 2a –
EngCo2 mechanical engineering 6 5 –
Eng Servs civil engineering contracting 16 1 3
FMCG consumer goods 3 5 6
RefreshCo food & drink 1 – 4
Household1 chemicals & household products 6 2 –
Household2b chemicals & household products 1 – 1
ITco IT services 19 8 9
PharmaChemb pharmaceuticals & chemicals 2 – 1
Total 69 23 24
Notes:
a In addition, interviews were conducted with two senior expatriate respondents in the UK
subsidiaries who are also members of the international product division executive board.
b Two small-scale case studies (Household2 and PharmaChem) are also included for
comparative purposes.
Table 1.
Case-Study Firms 
The Centralization-Decentralization Dynamic in US MNCs in
Britain: Empirical Evidence
This section uses empirical findings to examine two elements of the
centralization-autonomy balance under-emphasized in the literature: 
the ‘oscillation’ between modes and the way in which corporate actors
constantly mobilize resources to negotiate the terms of the balance between
central control and subsidiary autonomy.
Centralization, Formalization, and Standardization
On the whole, the case studies confirm the picture of centrally devised policies
disseminated globally (see Table 2  for a summary of the findings). Only 
one subsidiary, Eng Servs, was distinctive in being managed in a fairly
decentralized way. This distinctiveness reflected structural factors such as the
relative size of the UK subsidiary and the nature of the sector in which
operations were high value and high risk while requiring detailed local
knowledge. But it also reflected the fact that the UK subsidiary of Eng Servs
was the largest and most profitable unit worldwide for its business division.
This was in large measure the result of the entrepreneurial business approach
of the UK operation, for example, in pioneering expansion into promising
Far Eastern markets (see Colling and Clark 2002).
For the others, common global (or international business division) policy
was particularly evident in areas such as performance management and the
accompanying systems of target-setting and appraisal; remuneration, including
bonuses and performance-related pay, employee share ownership, and market
positioning on pay levels; communication, culture, and values; and manage-
ment development and training (Table 2). The extent to which policies were
mandated, recommended, or simply available to subsidiaries ‘off-the-shelf’
varied with the company and the issue. Policies on pay and appraisal for senior
staff tended to be highly prescribed, with more latitude for the management
of non-managerial employees. For example, formal global performance-
appraisal systems often stopped at the level of first-line management. In many
cases, central policy dictated a general framework within which subsidiaries
had a relative freedom to adapt to local circumstances.
Increasingly, the main level driving HR policy was, as in many MNCs
(Marginson and Sisson 1994), the international business division, reflecting
the increasing international integration of productive activity within com-
panies. The regional level, too, was growing in importance, often through
business-geography matrices. In seven of the nine companies listed in Table
1, there was a significant European headquarters (sometimes covering other
geographical areas as well). In ITco, for example, HR functions and policy-
making were being centralized in Europe-wide units covering areas such as
graduate recruitment, international assignments, and HR support and advice.
This led to a marked reduction in the autonomy and influence of national
subsidiaries. Europeanization of corporate structures clearly reflected the
growing integration of the regional economy as a result of the Single
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European Market. In several companies, production facilities were being
rationalized across Europe (for example, Household1 and Household2), so it
increasingly made sense to consider the European region as a whole. The
Europeanized structures also responded to the emergence of a distinct
‘regulatory space’ in the European Union (Marginson 2000). In the HR area,
issues such as working time, parental leave, and employee representation
were shaped by EU directives. From the point of view of corporate HQ, the
European level was a means of clarifying communications by aggregating
inputs from a diverse range of countries. It was also a response to cost-cutting
pressures: money could be saved by consolidating HR and other services at
European level, and by locating labour-intensive functions (such as HR
support centres) in countries where labour costs were relatively low and
labour flexibility high (for example, in regards to shift-working).
The rising importance of the regional level could be at the expense of the
national subsidiary, as in ITco and FMCG, and could mean the loss of status
and authority for national HR personnel. However, this was not necessarily
the case. In Refreshco, for example, a massive decentralization from corporate
HQ filtered down to the national level, with the transfer of responsibilities for
a range of policies, such as performance management, grading, pay and
bonuses, and diversity, previously standardized at headquarters.
Centralization of HR also covered substantive areas that were distinctively
American. First, the concern of companies to harness the tools of social
science to understand the motivation and attitudes of their workforce (see
especially Jacoby 1997) was evident in the use by most companies of regular
employee opinion surveys that were centrally designed, mandatory, and
applied in a standardized way to subsidiaries worldwide. Normally, the results
would be collated and monitored centrally and if local subsidiaries showed
poor results in particular areas, they would be expected to devise plans for
improvement. The survey could be explicitly linked, as in Household2, with
the guiding values of the corporation.
Second, in some companies, notably EngCo2 and FMCG, there were
mandatory global policies on workforce ‘diversity’. In one, the policy included
global targets for women in senior posts; in the other, foreign affiliates were
expected to define the content of ‘diversity’ according to the circum-
stances of the host environment, but there was a common framework of
diversity training and each site worldwide set up ‘diversity councils’ as 
a channel for workforce views on diversity and as a vehicle for defining 
the ‘business case’ for diversity. A third company, Refreshco, had only 
very recently moved away from a highly standardized global diversity 
policy which had entailed the detailed central collection of a variety of
diversity statistics. Even after decentralization, this company still insisted that
subsidiaries have an employment-diversity policy reflecting the compo-
sition of the customers they served (a theme common to several companies).
Details were left to subsidiaries, but here and in other companies, progress
was monitored by higher levels. In ITco, there was no mandatory global
policy, but there was a corporate vice-president with responsibility for
encouraging diversity globally, and groups were set up in subsidiaries to set
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Table 2 Centralization–Decentralization of HR and IR policy
Firm General Role of Europe/ Involvement of Substantive Management Communications Unions and Work organization 
region & subsidiary in issues: pay & development cultural values, collective (for manufacturing
international HR policy performance and training diversity relations/ EWC companies)
business divisions formation management
Eng Servs Relative weakness European HQ with UK’s own Performance- No regular Central Little central 
of central financial strong policy role appraisal system related pay global intervention on influence, no 
and HR systems; in HR and other for engineers system devised employee European international
but pressures for matters, but not taken up as in UK opinion survey subsidiaries’ benchmarking; 
globalization covering business corporate model EWC policy UK often in 
leading to review division that the New appraisal vanguard on work 
of functions UK is part of system focusing organization
including HR on individual issues
but driven from 
the UK 
Engco1 Network-based Weak coordination Subsidiary Development and Central Mandated Formal global Teamworking: 
‘pooled’ control in Europe above sometimes performance monitoring of ‘cultural values’, principle of form, content, link 
rather than country level originates policy appraisal system senior detail left to employees not with pay level etc. 
‘command & that gets taken globally management affiliates; de facto feeling the need left to affiliate, but 
control’ policy Move to strong up by the mandated (scope pool commonality for unions, but some interchange 
international corporation (e.g. for local within businesses detailed policy of ideas between 
Much central business divisions shared services, adaptation) left to subsidiary countries
policy notionally from 1990s teamworking) Global, standard with little central 
optional, but non- Global bonuses opinion survey involvement
compliance needs and share with central 
to be justified purchase policies monitoring
Engco2 Direct influence of International Growing Growing global Intention to Formal worldwide Owner-driven Team-based 
owner & family business division subsidiary standardization standardize mission being corporate ethos production
on company increasingly demands for of performance global training introduced, based of seeing unions systems common 
‘ethos’ important, but involvement in management & development on consultation as a check on across plants, but 
regions less so; global HR policy systems with subsidiaries management, but local autonomy on 
Strong central HR director of policy process good working detail
influence; cost- one division is Intended global Worldwide open- relations with 
driven UK-based policy of using door policy unions in the UK 
standardization, appraised subsidiary
subsidiaries have performance to Strong global 
to make ‘business weed out under- diversity policy 
reasons’ case for performing with common 
adaptating global employees elements world-
policies locally wide (e.g. staff 
Global policy to diversity groups, 
be at median training content)
pay levels 
Firm General Role of Europe/ Involvement of Substantive Management Communications Unions and Work organization 
region & subsidiary in issues: pay & development cultural values, collective (for manufacturing
international HR policy performance and training diversity relations/ EWC companies)
business divisions formation management
FMCG Increasing HR Increasing Stronger Global employee Global system Central global Dealing with Increasing
autonomy for centralization subsidiaries more ESOPs of identifying opinion survey, unions is a local benchmarking
international within region (e.g. able to win local high potentials, linked to senior issue, but HQ between plants 
business divisions, approval of senior flexibility from Prescriptive coordinated subsidiary ethos questions internationally in 
sometimes appointments) HQ central guidelines from HQ managers’ the need for terms of best 
conflicting with on pay (e.g. at performance unions practice
centralization Some Europe-level risk percentage 40 hours’ training measurement
within regions functions (e.g. in bonus scheme) per employee, 
remuneration) centrally Cultural values 
contracted to Global senior monitored driven from 
country operations management centre, formalized 
performance relatively recently
Use of virtual scheme linked to 
European corporate values Worldwide
structures diversity policy 
Global policy of with metrics and 
pay being at mid- link to appraisal;
point of market detail left to 
affiliates, but must
include gender 
issues 
Household1 Impact of Growing Local flexibility Pay and benefits Standardized Open-door Informal ethos of Global policy of 
owning family importance of within central globally driven global training policy worldwide not recognizing high-performance 
still strong: UK European regional policy for appraisal/ unions ideally, work teams, but 
plant closure level, leading to grading/ Standard global but working with implemented 
plan vetoed by reduction in Local competence corporate values them where they differently in 
owner country autonomy subsidiaries can system statement exist different countries
influence central 
Global National HR policy by Centralized Triennial global 
restructuring managers have pointing out training staff survey; 
& rationalization European ‘problems’; initiatives annual European 
initiatives responsibilities anxiety not to survey
‘reinvent the 
In HR, tendency Shared HR (and wheel’ Strong global 
to centralization other) services for diversity policy, 
and globalization Europe located in employee groups 
though with local London for women, ethnic
flexibility and sexual 
minorities, etc.
Firm General Role of Europe/ Involvement of Substantive Management Communications Unions and Work organization 
region & subsidiary in issues: pay & development cultural values, collective (for manufacturing
international HR policy performance and training diversity relations/ EWC companies)
business divisions formation management
Recent move to 
business divisions; 
businesses 
dominate business/
region matrix
Household2 Considerable Europe able to Significant HR Pay & appraisal Global Very influential, Global culture of 
devolution of HR challenge central flexibility in systems succession long-standing, avoiding unions 
to European HR policy subsidiary, developed in planning globally mandated if possible, but 
region guidelines within central Europe statement of cooperation 
framework of Standardized corporate values where they exist
European role in values Executive leadership
headcount control, compensation competences & Standard global 
training, executive worldwide training in employee survey 
compensation; Europe
European project 
teams to handle 
plant closures
ITco Fluctuations from 1990s away from Affiliates’ role Performance- Standardized Global staff Strong global 
highly centralized, ‘country-centred’ in global policy related pay a management of survey culture of union 
to countries, to HR to development (e.g. fundamental executive avoidance where 
regions/ global centralization induction policy) tenet resources Europeanization possible, but 
businesses within Europe, with through of communications some ‘backdoor’ 
Europe-level HR Appraisal system Global appraisal leadership – away from unionization
call centre, seen as and worldwide competences country-based through
graduate developed in bonus system and training ‘flavour’ acquisition of 
recruitment, the UK, then based on outsourced IT 
management of globalized business results European model workforces
international and appraisal of assessment 
assignments rating centres for 
graduates
Centrally driven 
leadership 
competences 
model
Firm General Role of Europe/ Involvement of Substantive Management Communications Unions and Work organization 
region & subsidiary in issues: pay & development cultural values, collective (for manufacturing
international HR policy performance and training diversity relations/ EWC companies)
business divisions formation management
PharmaChem Creeping European HR Little subsidiary Mandated rigid Bureaucratic Cultural vision IR seen as an area 
centralization of function composed input into performance- global system of and values of ‘total freedom’
HR following of country HR international appraisal system management generic rather for subsidiaries, 
merger, ‘top- managers with policy development & than explicit though ethos of 
down’, ‘tablets European Global system succession union avoidance
of stone’ approach responsibilities of base pay and planning
to HR policy stock options and
bonus scheme
Policy of median 
base pay levels
Increasing 
direct intervention
in pay from USA 
(e.g. cap on pay 
rises) 
RefreshCo Recent change Decentralization Freedom to Mandatory Previous Framework of No unions in GB
from highly from HQ to 4 design HR performance- provision of cultural values 
centralized to broad regional policy locally related function-based 
decentralized HR, units and a lower within European/ remuneration, but induction Worldwide
reflecting refocus level European global strategic details now left training from diversity ethos 
on making ‘global group comprising policy to subsidiaries – HQ – cut with with central 
brands local’ individuals located frameworks previously tightly restructuring, monitoring; 
in national prescribed from leading to a content now 
subsidiaries USA vacuum left to subsidiaries
targets for the recruitment of women to leadership positions and to track
progress.
This emphasis on diversity was a clear reflection of the US domestic policy
agenda, linked to affirmative action legislation on race and gender, and to
companies’ concerns both to widen the pool of scarce professional and
managerial skills and to reflect a culturally and ethnically heterogeneous
customer base in the domestic market. Nonetheless, diversity was driven
ethnocentrically as a global policy. Sometimes this had counter-productive
results, as when one company attempted to diffuse new policies on the
treatment of same-sex and unmarried couples, provoking strong reaction in
some foreign subsidiaries where such policies were culturally controversial,
and hence resulting in increased variation rather than greater standardization
in policy across countries.
The standardized dissemination of such centrally devised policies may be
seen also as reflecting a defining characteristic of many US firms: the huge
size of the US domestic market, which in turn had traditionally meant that
the foreign operations of many MNCs, though large in local terms, were 
a small proportion of total corporate activity. As a result, argued a number 
of UK managers, there was a tradition of parochial and inward-looking HR
in which policies were designed centrally with the US workforce in mind 
and then disseminated to the company’s operations worldwide. However, 
the international growth of companies meant that the weight of foreign
employment was increasing. In EngCo2 and ITco, for example, more than
half of all employment was outside the USA.
Oscillation between Centralization and Subsidiary Autonomy
Nevertheless, the findings also suggest significant qualifications to the argu-
ments of the literature. First, as important as the degree of (de)centralization
was the evidence of movement from one state to another. Particularly
noticeable in some companies (for example, ITco and PharmaChem) was 
an oscillation between centralized and decentralized forms of management
that also affected HR. ITco, for example, had moved away from a highly
centralized global approach in the 1980s, ceding more power to the country
affiliates. But corporate crisis led the higher levels to claw back power in the
1990s. However, the renewed centralization was primarily at regional level
and within businesses, rather than for the global corporation. In PharmaChem,
which was the result of the merger of a pharmaceuticals and a chemical
company, the fluctuation in the degree of central control partly reflected the
clash of styles as one of the partners became dominant. The pharmaceuticals
partner had been used to a decentralized style with considerable subsidiary
autonomy. The other partner progressively imposed its own top-down ‘tablets
of stone’ approach on the merged company, with a range of central interven-
tions on such issues as pay criteria, performance appraisal, and the outsourcing
of HR services. This in turn provoked resistance from subsidiaries used to
greater independence (see below). EngCo2 had attempted to centralize and
standardize international HR policy as the company became more of a global
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operator. A concern with cutting costs in the face of intensifying international
competition led to cost-cutting. However, the increasing weight of operations
outside the US also prompted moves to decentralize authority from corporate
HQ to international business divisions, and provoked attempts by national
subsidiaries to increase their influence on policy (see below). In Refreshco,
worldwide expansion had been led from headquarters in a highly centralized
fashion. As markets matured, the company moved toward a strategy of
adapting global brands to local consumer tastes in order to maximize future
market growth. Even in Eng Servs, the highly decentralized management of
the UK subsidiary showed signs of erosion under the pressures of market
changes, such as the increasing international integration of client firms, and
of internal cost-cutting (see Colling and Clark 2002).
This ‘ebb and flow’, as one respondent called it, can be traced back to rapidly
changing external conditions. International competition hitting US companies,
often combined with accelerating technological change and merger move-
ments, has increased market volatility sharply in recent decades. Although it
is too early to identify with precision whether this picture is specific to
American MNCs, the intense exposure of US companies to pressures from
financial markets, encapsulated in the ideology of ‘shareholder value’ (see, for
example, O’Sullivan 2000), is likely to have reinforced the volatility of
management response. More fundamentally, the US business system’s relative
under-institutionalization, compared with the strong, relatively rigid institu-
tional arrangements of, say, Germany, may encourage constant structural
adjustment to changing market circumstances (Hollingsworth 1997).
But oscillation also reflects another characteristic that can be assumed to
apply to MNCs more generally. As the above examples also illustrate, the
degree of centralization was a negotiated and, at times, contested process;
oscillation between centralization and autonomy may therefore be seen as a
manifestation of the interplay of interests between MNC actors at different
levels, rather than as a mechanical response to structural changes in the
environment.
The Negotiation of the Centralization-Autonomy Balance
This negotiation of interests has, as noted, been a long-observed element in
relations between MNC head offices and subsidiaries (for example, Brooke
1984; Martin and Beaumont 1999). But it was now being fuelled by objective
structural changes, such as the growth of non-US markets and the trends
described by writers such as Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) and Hedlund (1986)
toward a greater worldwide diffusion of strategic responsibilities within
MNCs. These changes provided an enabling context in which subsidiaries
could mount claims to greater international influence. At the same time, the
‘ethnocentric’ policy tendencies of US MNCs (deriving standardized global
policies on the basis of what was appropriate for US conditions) also gave
more incentive to subsidiaries to contest policy.
There were two arenas of negotiation: policy creation and policy
implementation. There appeared to be a marked trend toward the increasing
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involvement of subsidiaries in the policy-development process, even where
policy remained driven from the centre and standardized. The process 
of subsidiary inclusion was more advanced in companies, such as ITco, that
had a long tradition of international operations and less advanced in others,
such as EngCo2, which saw themselves as in the transition stage from being
US companies with foreign operations to becoming fully international
companies. In some cases, as in EngCo1, an important trigger in opening up
the international HR policy-making process seemed to be a sustained period
of international growth through acquisitions, which not only shifted the centre
of gravity in the company, but also brought in new expertise and perspectives.
Another trigger was the development in several companies of strategic
activities such as product design and development outside the USA, as was
the case in EngCo1; this reflected the need to adapt products to the specific
requirements of growing regional (or national) markets abroad.
The involvement of subsidiaries in HR policy-making took various forms.
Country HR managers often had European ‘hats’, so that regionalization did
not always involve as clear cut a reduction in subsidiary influence and
autonomy as might be expected. In PharmaChem, for example, a European
HR council brought together national HR managers and gave them Europe-
wide HR responsibilities for different business divisions. Partly as a result 
of the strong country presence in European HR, the relationship between 
the European level and corporate HR was ambiguous. While the European
level could be seen as an intermediate level of centralization and a means 
of exerting central control over the subsidiaries, it also provided national
subsidiaries with a common voice and a means of interest aggregation vis-à-
vis central HR, and there were indications that it could align itself with the
subsidiaries, fighting central proposals on their behalf. Where senior European
HR managers had come from country subsidiaries, they often retained strong
links with their country base and at the very least understood its perspective.
In some companies, subsidiaries had to struggle to win involvement in HR
policy formulation. In EngCo2, where policy remained largely centralized
and was becoming increasingly standardized worldwide, a senior HR manager
from the UK subsidiary together with allies from other foreign subsidiaries
initiated a major change in policy. At a global HR conference held by the
corporate HR function, this group of subsidiary managers challenged US
control over the HR policy agenda, and the lack of a global perspective in
policy-making. They argued that since policies were designed by corporate
HR without a subsidiary input, HQ ‘then get a lot of pushback because it
doesn’t work in one region’ (senior business-divisional HR manager). As 
a result, a number of international project teams were formed to design
improvements in the process of policy generation through earlier HR input
from the regions. One of the first fruits of the new policy was the secondment
of a UK HR manager to the USA to head an international team developing a
new global performance-management policy. EngCo2 therefore appeared to
provide a case in which standardized global policy was being constructed in
a decentralized, collective manner. However, such gains were tentative:
corporate cost-cutting meant that international policy teams were unable to
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meet for long periods, possibly allowing seconded subsidiary managers to 
be ‘co-opted’ by central HR. It seems plausible to suggest that in general,
headquarters groups disadvantaged by the internationalization of policy-
making will use such eventualities to push back against the changes. We have
no direct evidence that this happened in EngCo2, but the new performance-
management system that emerged had little subsidiary input.
In terms of policy implementation, in practice larger, more successful
subsidiaries (for example, EngCo1 or FMCG) had reasonable scope to
interpret even nominally standardized policies in the light of local conditions
— a finding that echoes studies of US MNC subsidiaries in Scotland (Tayeb
1998; Tayeb and Thory 2001). For example, a senior product manager in
EngCo1 told of how a new global performance-appraisal system was adapted
in the UK. Originally designed to decouple appraisal from pay determination
so that these became two separate processes, the new scheme was resisted in
the UK, where employees felt uncomfortable with it. As a result, the UK was
allowed to retain the direct link between the appraisal score and the pay award.
Even in ITco, one of the most standardized of the companies, there was de
facto flexibility. An example concerned the highly standardized international
system for recording the hours breakdown of customer-facing staff. One
respondent claimed that as long as he complied formally with the system by
entering values in the computerized hours matrix, there was no scrutiny or
auditing of his responses.
In several firms, including EngCo1 and Household1, flexibility was overtly
permitted providing that non-compliance with central policy could be
justified, and as long as the subsidiaries’ actions did not ‘compromise’ central
policy or the position of other facilities. In many instances, a subsidiary had
a strong incentive to comply with central policies even where they were
optional, since to do so was more cost-effective than ‘reinventing the wheel’
by developing its own.
An important lever for subsidiary management in negotiating the degree
of (de)centralization was the existence of local institutional constraints on
their activity. This allowed them to resist central pressure for a standardized
policy. For example, FMCG’s UK subsidiary resisted the regimented global
policy on diversity on the grounds that positive discrimination was against
UK law: ‘we tend to use the legal argument as the best one, that’s the 
one that’s difficult for them to argue with’ (UK HR director). This gambit
could arouse considerable suspicion in corporate headquarters, however. For
example, during an international redundancy programme in FMCG, as a
senior UK respondent commented:
‘They [US HQ] still think ... that the push-back they might get on this is because we
don’t want to do it. Not because we can’t do it ... to the point where actually just a
few weeks ago we did get our European legal director to drop a note back to the
required people and say “here, look, this is not the soft touchy-feely HR people thing
that you can’t do this, you really can’t do this!”’
This use of constraints in the local environment to achieve a relaxation of
the constraints imposed by central company policy has been observed in other
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contexts (for example, Quintanilla 1998). In areas less clear cut than these
statutory limitations on managerial freedom, local management has consid-
erable leeway in the interpretation of the local environment and, consequently,
in the determination of what is or is not a ‘constraint’.
However, given central HR’s suspicions, there was a limit to the ‘local
constraints’ arguments, and subsidiary managers were very conscious of the
need to put forward acceptable rationales for resisting central policy. An
illustration is provided by a redundancy programme in EngCo2. HQ demanded
a given level of job cuts worldwide on a rigid centrally determined timetable,
but the UK company argued that it should have more time to achieve the
reduction. The UK plant’s resistance was not justified primarily by reference
to UK legislation concerning redundancy (although that was an element), but
rested, first, on a distinction between ends and means:
‘I said, “tell me what you want as an end result okay, and let us tell you how we’ll
get there — don’t tell us both where to get to and how to get there.” Because what they
were doing, they were applying US prescriptions to UK situations.’ (UK HR manager)
The second element of the UK’s rationale was to provide a business case
for the proposed course of action. The UK argued that it already had a plan
that would eventually lead to a greater reduction in numbers, while preserving
staff morale and commitment. The case was helped by the unions’ willingness
to sing from the same hymn sheet and refrain from aggressive tactics that
would have only provoked a reaction from the Americans. The UK’s proposal
was eventually accepted by the Americans, albeit reluctantly, and the
subsidiary was allowed to do things its own way. Its success gave it added
credibility with HQ, allowing it more easily to claim autonomy on subsequent
issues. Had it failed, it is likely that its autonomy would have been more
constrained in the future.
This example also illustrates the importance of the rhetorical aspect of
negotiation. As the UK HR manager stressed, the language for dealing with
the centre was important. You should not say:
‘“Can’t do that”, and they don’t like “you don’t know how it works over here” either,
because that makes them feel inadequate or it’s again seen as a negative.... The word
“why” comes up — [the US response is] “why not?”, which then generates some
conflicts. Those things I learned early on in that process, there were certain ways of
responding to questions... The first thing you say is “yes” in an American company
... they don’t like “no”, it doesn’t sound very can-do to them.’
Another source of leverage for managers in the subsidiaries was their
ability to exploit tensions between one central policy and another. In Pharma-
Chem, according to a senior UK HR manager, when the centre imposed a
mandatory worldwide pay limit, it was strongly opposed by the British. Their
counter-argument was that such a limit would undermine the company’s
preference for non-union, unitarist employment relations, since the unionized
plant in North-West England would inevitably breach the limit and unionized
employees would thus receive more than the non-union employees at the
company’s other main plant. When HQ HR executives responded that shop-
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floor employees at the non-union plant could be given a deal in excess of
managerial employees, the UK HR function retorted that:
‘We are trying to build a team-based, holistic, single-status organization, and we give
differential pay increases!... We’re transparent, we’re open, we’re honest, and [then]
we do this! What message are we sending to people? We then cause an adversarial
relationship to build up.... The whole philosophy of the site for 30-odd years has been
non-union, non-divisive, all together. All for one, one for all. I said [to the US
manager] “you can’t overturn this sort of thing. Especially when it works and
delivers... your number one product is packed at [the non-union plant]. Do we want
a union getting in there, causing trouble? I don’t think so. And I don’t think the
President Europe is going to be too keen.”’ (UK HR manager)
Transitions between degrees of centralization or decentralization could
provoke tensions as they restructured power relations among different
corporate interest groups and altered the resources available to them. In
Refreshco, the centrally driven decentralization process appeared to generate
two opposing kinds of conflict. On the one hand, local managers perceived
that the US HR function was still finding it difficult to abandon its old
centralizing reflexes; for example, it was said to be trying to globalize policy
revisions introduced in the wake of diversity litigation affecting just the USA.
On the other hand, decentralization caused problems because subsidiaries 
lost HQ support for policy implementation, and they had to invest resources
in developing local-level capabilities for training and other policy areas
previously provided centrally.
The micro-political dynamics of centre–subsidiary relations are compli-
cated by what might be called the interpenetration of management elites. As
already discussed, in several companies, individuals with HR responsibilities
at regional level were also national subsidiary managers. Within subsidiaries,
key roles were sometimes performed by expatriate managers who retained
close links with corporate headquarters. In one company, senior American
managers were in key posts as plant managers and heads of product groups
and in senior roles in other functions, including HR. Senior UK operations
managers (mostly US expatriates) were members of the international executive
management team of the US-headquartered business division of which the
UK operation was part. Hence, the UK subsidiary was highly integrated into
the process of international policy-making and objective setting for the
business. The boundaries between head office and the subsidiary were thus
blurred.
Lastly, as the existence of de facto negotiation suggests, while formal
centrally managed systems and policies were important, informality was also
sometimes more pervasive than some accounts of the US mode of control
might suggest. Most obviously, in firms in which the influence of the founding
father was still strong, informality and personalism continued to coexist
alongside formal and impersonal systems. In Household1, a decision to close
the manufacturing operation in the UK and transfer production to the continent
was reversed after being vetoed by the family. But even in some non-family-
owned companies (EngCo1 was an example) things happened as much through
consensus seeking, informal networking, and collegiality, as through formal
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processes and hierarchical authority. A senior HR manager in the UK spoke
of a ‘shared pool’ of authority rather than central control. Negotiation took
place to ‘establish consensus’ and ‘make things happen’. At the UK level, a
policy innovation of having ‘shared services’ in HR across the different
businesses was established through ‘negotiation’ and ‘partnership’ between
HR and the businesses rather than mandated through a hierarchical structure.
This involved assiduously building up support from key managing directors,
helping neutralize potential opposition to the initiative from the respective
business-level HR functions.
As argued elsewhere, informal processes often provide important under-
pinnings for formal systems; without the former, the latter run the risk of being
‘empty shells’ with little effect on actual practice in the subsidiaries (Ferner
2000b). In this sense, informality may be seen as an important accompaniment
of a formalized, centralized modus operandi. Nonetheless, the data indicate
that the extent of informality was not a given, but depended on the presence
of certain supporting factors. First, as suggested, in personalistic, family-owned
firms the influence of the owning family could create parallel informal
structures of influence. A second factor appeared to be size. Informality,
particularly in horizontal networks, was more practicable in companies such
as the two referred to above that were still relatively small by the standards of
major multinationals, with tens of thousands of employees worldwide rather
than hundreds of thousands. Indeed, managers at EngCo1 envisaged a decline
in informal networking as the MNC grew in size and became more diverse. A
final factor may be the presence of expatriates in senior management positions,
especially noticeable again in EngCo1, providing managers over time with an
internationally disseminated web of contacts on which they can call.
Discussion and Conclusions
The article has examined through case-study evidence a characteristic trait
of US MNCs: the centralization, standardization, and formalization of HR
policy. While confirming much of the conventional picture, the article has
attempted to go beyond existing approaches. First, where appropriate, it has
suggested linkages between the nature of the centralization dynamic and the
national origins of these MNCs. In particular, the development of distinctive
‘organizational capabilities’ in order to deliver standardized products to mass
markets has provided the technical means and the managerial experience to
manage overseas operations in a centralized, formalized, and standardized
way. But, to the extent that patterns of centralization, standardization, and
formalization in US MNCs are in practice underpinned by informal networks
and understandings, the differences between the American model and other
models of international management may be more muted than at first appears.
Second, qualifying conventional evolutionary ‘stages of development’
assumptions, the research has pointed to more contingent patterns of
‘oscillation’ between centralization and decentralization in response to the
greater volatility of the external environment. The arguments about MNCs’
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rootedness in specific national business systems imply that the extent of
oscillation is likely to vary. MNCs’ responses to common external pressures
are likely to be partly determined by the institutional characteristics of 
the country-of-origin business system. While in the context of the under-
institutionalized US business system, rapid changes of tack at the level of
corporate structure are both permitted and expected, this may not be the case
in more regulated business systems facing the same environmental pressures.
Thus, the greater institutional rigidities of the German system, and companies’
experience of operating in a stable and predictable environment, may be
expected to dampen the ability of German-based MNCs to react to external
change by rapid and flexible changes in organizational structures, not least
because the institutional framework provides organizational actors (including
unions and works councils) with greater power to resist changes in the status
quo (compare Vitols 2001).
Third, the findings suggest the need to specify carefully the locus of
‘centralization’. European integration has strengthened the importance of the
European regional level in the determination of MNCs’ HR policies, implying
both a recentralization away from the national level and a relaxation of control
from corporate HQ. A separate dynamic has seen the rise of international
business divisions integrating productive activity across borders, with a
corresponding devolution of HR issues from corporate HQ to businesses (and
a centralization from the national subsidiary level). Sometimes these structural
principles are in tension, as when the logic of the international business
structure conflicts with cost-saving imperatives requiring greater cross-
business centralization of HR, manifested in several companies in the concept
of ‘shared services’. Such tensions at the level of corporate organizational
responses to external change may fuel the pattern of oscillation between
centralization and decentralization, with complex shifts as between business
and region.
Fourth, while oscillation undoubtedly reflects external changes and
conflicting tendencies in MNC organizational structure, such changes have
to be interpreted and acted upon by actors within the corporation. It has been
argued, in contrast to the apolitical top-management perspective of much of
the international corporate strategy literature, that centralization is constructed
through the interaction of organizational actors at different levels. One
important thread of argument is that the degree of centralization is not
determined in a mechanical way by headquarters edict, but emerges out of a
process of negotiation between head office and the subsidiary. In this process,
the growing strategic importance of subsidiaries with the growth of markets
outside the USA provides a basis for the increased bargaining power of host-
country managers. In short, oscillation is partly a reflection of the negotiation
process that underlies the definition of the centralization-autonomy balance
in a given instance.
Fifth, a number of processes underpinning this negotiation of central control
have been identified, and further research could explore how far they are
typical of US and other kinds of MNC. These processes appear to be important
in indicating how subsidiaries (not to mention head offices) actually deploy
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the power ‘resources’ that writers such as Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) have
attributed to them. First, overt challenges and resistance to central control by
subsidiaries in some cases rest on exploiting internal inconsistencies or
complexities in corporate policy, as in the PharmaChem incident in which the
subsidiary resisted central pay intervention by invoking the corporate principle
of avoiding unions. The claimed adherence to one central policy thus provided
a rhetoric of legitimation for avoiding compliance with another.
Second, subsidiary managers find leverage in their role as interpreters of
the local environment, allowing them to resist centrally imposed standard-
ization and to secure local modification of central policies. Institutional
constraints within the host business system (for example, equal opportunities
legislation or EU directives covering workforce consultation on redundancies)
could be adduced as grounds for not complying with HQ policy. The
significance for corporate action of the institutions of the local business
system is to a degree indeterminate, and therefore becomes a terrain of combat
between subsidiary and head office. However, US headquarters could be
unsympathetic to subsidiary non-compliance on the grounds of local constraint
(perhaps because of the relative lack of constraints on management action
within the US business system) and hence one might expect greater limits to
the use of this gambit by subsidiaries of US MNCs than by those of MNCs
rooted in more regulated business regimes. Partly for this reason, there 
is evidence of close attention being paid by subsidiary managers to the
‘legitimatory rhetoric’ accompanying and justifying their resistance to central
control. Actors at head office can take steps to reduce the ‘interpretative gap’
by despatching high-level expatriates to the subsidiaries — strengthening the
local implementation of central policies by weakening subsidiary manage-
ment’s claims to specialist local knowledge.
Third, penetration by subsidiaries of the policy-making process (for
example, through participation in international policy task forces and by
occupying key posts in regional-level management structures) is a mechanism
for softening the dominance of head office, so that standardized, formalized
global policy becomes generated through a more collective process and is
less likely to be seen by subsidiaries as a central initiative to be resisted. In
order to engage with the policy-making process, subsidiary managers already
will have had to deploy resources to build corporate credibility (compare
Birkinshaw and Fry (1998) on how subsidiaries lobby for global ‘charters’)
and may have to take account of the resistance of central actors whose roles
are being undermined. Lastly, as this implies, functional managers at head
office (for example, HR specialists responsible for policy generation) may
well have power resources that allow them to resist decentralization, even
when the devolution is sanctioned by top management. They may do so (as
appeared to be the case in Refreshco) by latching on to key aspects of a
corporate culture or policy agenda, such as ‘diversity’, in order to legitimate
overseas interventions.
The findings of the study also have implications for broader questions
concerning the routes of transmission, whereby ‘American’ traits are diffused
within MNCs to their foreign operations. It is precisely the centralized 
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and formalized systems of control over HR and IR (and in other areas of
management) that may be expected to form the primary transmission channel
for substantive traits in US MNCs, compared to the much greater use of
personal control through expatriation as described in Japanese companies by
writers such as Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) (see also Harzing 1999).
A final issue concerns the generalizability of the findings, particularly
concerning oscillation and negotiation, to issues other than HR. As has been
found repeatedly in the literature, HR and IR issues are more likely to be subject
to institutional host-country constraints than many other issues (Rosenzweig
and Nohria 1994). Moreover, regulation covering employment issues is highly
variable across issues and across national business systems. To this extent, HR
is a particularly fertile terrain for the negotiating leverage provided by the
subsidiary’s position as ‘interpreter’ of host-context constraints for the corporate
HQ. One could hypothesize, therefore, that the scope for negotiation is
correspondingly reduced for other issues. Nonetheless, HRM is not the only
area where local ‘interpretation’ is relevant. In terms of marketing strategies,
for example, the nuances of local demand and tastes may provide equivalent
leverage to subsidiary management. Even in areas such as research and
development, scope for negotiation over the extent of centralization may exist
as companies try to exploit the comparative advantages of particular foreign
locations resulting from particular research skills or relationships with local
actors such as universities or governments. This may give local management a
role as ‘interpreter’ of these capabilities for HQ, and thus enable it to negotiate
over the precise degree of autonomy of local facilities. In short, the processes
of negotiation observed with respect to the degree of centralization of HR are
not prima facie restricted to HR. Similar oscillating patterns stemming from the
‘ebb and flow’ of negotiation may therefore be observable for other issues too.
In summary, the findings both confirm those of the existing literature and
extend them by, first, providing a greater insight into the embeddedness of
MNC practices in an American business system that is dynamic and evolving;
second, by exploring the way in which centralization responds to different
dynamics, both long-term evolutionary developments and short-term
contingent and ‘oscillating’ pressures; and third, by arguing that these external
pressures provide only a broad structural framework, within which the precise
level and meaning of central control versus local autonomy is negotiated by
actors at different organizational levels.
We are very grateful to Organization Studies’ anonymous reviewers for some helpful and
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US multinationals in Europe, coordinated by the Department of HRM, Business School, De
Montfort University, UK. The research is funded by the ESRC and the Anglo-German
Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society. The other research teams are: in Germany, the
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Ireland, the University of Limerick (Paddy Gunnigle and Michael Morley); and in Spain, IESE
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